Th e Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the most recently established international criminal tribunal. Controversially created by the UN Security Council in 2007 amid rising political tensions in the country, it is designed to investigate a number of politically motivated killings, including the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafi k Hariri in 2005. It shares many characteristics of other hybrid (or "internationalized") criminal tribunals, especially the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which facilitated its speedy establishment. But it breaks new ground as an international eff ort to specifi cally end impunity for terrorist acts. Th is article argues that in many respects, the legal framework of the Special Tribunal distills the "best practices" of prior tribunals. At the same time, the debate over its creation and its chances to assist the peace process in Lebanon continues.
I. Introduction
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that a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (the Tribunal) would be established according to the terms of a draft agreement previously negotiated between the UN and the Government of Lebanon, unless the Lebanese Parliament ratified the agreement and therefore consented to the establishment of the Tribunal on its own account by 10 June 2007. Th e latter did not happen. In fulfilment of this "sunrise clause", the Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic as well as the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL-Statute) therefore automatically entered into force on that date.
1 Th e process of the practical establishment of the Tribunal was already under way in late 2007. It will be exclusively tasked with prosecuting persons responsible for high-level terrorist attacks in Lebanon since the end of 2004. Th e main event to be prosecuted is the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri 2 in early 2005, which is the reason why the Tribunal is also referred to as the "Hariri-Tribunal". Other regional issues of potential relevance for international criminal law, such as e.g. the so-called "summer war" between Israel and the Hezbollah in Lebanon in August 2006, will not be subject to juridical scrutiny by the Tribunal. Th is armed conflict lasted over 30 days, cost the lives of approximately 1200 persons on the Lebanese and approximately 150 on the Israeli side and was only ended by Security Council Resolution 1701 (2007).
3
II. Background
On 14 February 2005 Rafik Hariri and 22 others were killed, approximately 220 injured, and the wider surrounding area severely damaged in a massive explosion in Beirut. Approximately 1,800 kilograms of TNT detonated inside a parked Mitsubishi van as his convoy passed. Th e assassination caused massive demonstrations in Lebanon and eventually led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country after nearly 30 years. 4 On the international level, a UN mission found that Lebanon's own inquiry had been flawed and that Syria had responsibility for risen tensions at the time. Th e UN Security Council quickly decided to establish an International Independent Investigative Committee (IIIC) to examine the exact circumstances of the bombing. 5 In October 2005 the Security Council determined that the terrorist bombing of Hariri constituted a threat to international peace and security and hence obliged all UN Member States, including Syria, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to cooperate with the IIIC.
6 Th e commission is based in Lebanon and was first headed by the German Prosecutor Detlev Mehlis. Early allegations as to the responsibility for the attack involved, inter alia, Syrian and Lebanese security agencies and led to the arrest of four high-ranking members of the Lebanese military on 30 August 2005.
7 Syria strongly denied any involvement. In January 2006 Mehlis was succeeded by the Belgian Serge Brammertz, who until 2007 also was a Deputy Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC). 8 In subsequent reports of the IIIC Brammertz declared to have identified "a number of persons", 9 but declined to name specific suspects or witnesses for reasons of security and in order not to prejudge possible court proceedings in the future. 10 According to findings released so far it appears that the bombing itself was carried out by a young male suicide-bomber of non-Lebanese origin, 11 who however had had considerable logistical and other support by a number of persons with a high degree of "security awareness" and "experience in handling explosives"; this bomb team had apparently prepared the attack over a longer period of time. 12 In December 2005, in reaction to a request by the government of Lebanon, the Security Council decided to modify the mandate of the IIIC to include the investigation of other attacks of a similar nature since 1 October 2004; but more importantly, it also extended the assistance of the UN beyond the technical work of investigations and requested the UN Secretary-General to examine the creation of a "tribunal of an international character". 13 Following a first report in March 2006, 14 the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the government of Lebanon aimed at the establishment of such a tribunal. 15 Several rounds of negotiations followed. 16 On 13 November 2006 the Lebanese cabinet agreed to the final draft. One week later the Lebanese cabinet minister Pierre Gemayel was shot on the street in Beirut. On the same day, just a few hours after the shooting, the Security Council approved the tribunal as proposed. 17 Hence, the legal framework of the Tribunal was finalized within less than two years after the underlying events had happened and within one year after the basic decision had been taken by the Security Council. 11) However, the person claiming responsibility in a video, Ahmed Abu Adass, is seen as likely being neither the bomber nor the instigator of the attack; see However, the draft agreement had at this point only been accepted by the Security Council and the Lebanese Cabinet; it was furthermore signed by the United Nations Legal Counsel Michel and a representative of the Lebanese Ministry of Justice in January and February 2007. Th e constitutionality of the respective acts of the Lebanese government, headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, has been questioned, since the cabinet was partially depleted by resignations of six ministers, among these all Shi'ite ones; the President of Lebanon Emile Lahoud challenged the government's approval on the grounds that the cabinet had thus lost its "legitimacy", 18 and claimed that according to the Lebanese constitution all international agreements must also be reviewed by him. 19 In any event, these acts had not gone through the complete constitutional process. 20 Since the agreement would have functioned as an international treaty between the UN and Lebanon, it still needed the approval by that State's parliament in order to enter into force.
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During the following months the Lebanese parliament was unable to do so. As part of the political crisis that ensued in Lebanon between the government and the Hezbollah-led opposition after November 2006, the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri did not convene a session, thereby in effect preventing the majority of government Members of Parliament to approve the agreement. Th ese even called on the newly elected SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon to initiate the establishment of the Tribunal by a binding resolution under Chapter VII of the UN 18) Th e main aspects of the division of power between the different confessions are laid down in the Taef (Saudi Arabia) Accord of 22 October 1989. According to this document, parliament is to be divided equally between Christians and Muslims (section II, B, 6). Concerning the decision-making on the STL-Agreement within the cabinet, the remaining 18 ministers out of a total of 24 still provided for the constitutional quorum of two thirds. Th e Taef Accord is silent on the question of the distribution of power among the different muslim factions. For 
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Charter, although this would imply bypassing their own legislature. 21 Th e United States, France, and the United Kingdom had also underlined their willingness to use a Chapter VII resolution as a last resort, but Russia and other council members had expressed reservations. At first, Ban Ki-moon had preferred a consensual agreement; 22 but he soon changed his mind after subsequent attempts to break the stalemate had failed, including visits by himself to the region in April 2007. In addition, the Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora had called on the Security Council to take action. 23 All of this prompted the passing of UNSC Resolution 1757 in May 2007, when the United States held the Presidency of the Security Council.
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III. Legal Character of the Special Tribunal
A. Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Law
Th e Special Tribunal for Lebanon belongs to the relatively recent category of hybrid international criminal tribunals. 25 As their most notable distinctive elements, these tribunals provide for mixtures of national and international staff, including the judges, as well as of the applicable law. Th ey also differ from the "traditional" international criminal tribunals of modern times -namely the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC -in their mode of establishment, in the location of their seat and in the way in which they are financed. It is not easy to categorize hybrid tribunals due to their varying forms and degrees of mixture of these national and international elements. One possibility would be to distinguish between hybrid tribunals set up within or outside of a national legal framework. 26 An alternative approach would be to divide hybrid tribunals into three sub-categories according to their respective legal bases: first, tribunals within UN-administrations, such as the internationalized panels in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, whose authority ultimately stems from the Security Council resolutions establishing the peacekeeping operations; second, tribunals set up on the bases of bilateral agreements, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and possibly a future Special Chamber for Burundi; 27 and third, tribunals set up essentially as domestic courts by national law, which however contain a considerable degree of international impetus, such as the War Crimes Chambers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, respectively, as well as the Iraqi Special Tribunal.
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Th e Secretary-General has characterized the Tribunal, which was originally planned to be treaty-based, as an international one, since the elements in this regard outweighed the national ones. 29 For example, it deviates from most of the other hybrid tribunals in that it operates outside of the national system of justice, matched only by the SCSL. Th e government of Lebanon will have the duty to cooperate with the Tribunal, which will have primacy over domestic court proceedings concerning crimes within its jurisdiction. 30 Now that it was directly created by the Security Council, no doubt remains as to its international character. But it was not supposed to be a UN-tribunal either. While being set up with the support of the United Nations and for a specific situation of the past, making it another ad hoc-tribunal, it was designed to be independent from that institution. Only the Registrar of the Tribunal will be a UN staff member, as it 26) Comp is also the case in Sierra Leone. 31 No funding will be granted from the regular UN budget. As a further important element, the Tribunal shall especially be independent from the Security Council. For example, during the negotiations Russia had proposed to let the judges be appointed by the Security Council which however would have given a veto-power -and hence considerable influence -to its five permanent Members. Th is proposal was eventually rejected.
B. Th e Competence of the Security Council to Establish the Tribunal as a Measure to Restore International Peace and Security
As mentioned before, at the outset the Tribunal had been planned to be a treaty-based tribunal. At present, this seems to be the preferred method of setting up new international criminal tribunals, since, among other reasons, hybrid tribunals are hoped to lead to an increase in support for juridical prosecutions within the affected population, while decreasing the financial burden on the United Nations. 33 But in the end the base of the Tribunal's creation is a resolution of the UN Security Council. Th e decision to pass a Chapter VII resolution on the subject was controversial and largely centred on the classification of the attacks on Rafik Hariri and the other victims as terrorist activities of international concern. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to re-examine the present discussion on terrorism in international law in its full complexity; in contrast, the following observations will address only two issues relevant in this regard, namely terrorism as a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter, and terrorism as an international crime, 34 without attempting to resolve these questions completely.
Politically, the supporters of the approach to create the Tribunal by a Security Council resolution stressed the fact that all options for a consen-31) Comp sual agreement had been tried unsuccessfully and that therefore the Security Council had had to act in order to show its determination in fighting impunity for political assassinations and to deter such acts in the future. Qatar's representative criticised the grace period of ten days for parliamentary ratification as too short and warned that the stability in the country could further deteriorate; but the ambassador of France insisted on a speedy beginning to react firmly to violent developments on the ground in Lebanon. 35 With regard to legal arguments, the opponents of the chosen way of establishment by a Chapter VII resolution were of the opinion that a resolution of this kind was either unnecessary, because all Security Council resolutions were binding under Article 25 of the UN Charter, or illegal, because the constitutional requirements for ratification were in essence a domestic affair and no international crime was in question. 36 During the negotiations it was decided to pass only the most important parts of the resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 37 
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drafting history of Article 25 as well as on a systematic approach. Th is approach takes into account that with a view to Article 2(5) of the UN Charter, which can be read as allowing States not to assist the United Nations in actions not in accordance with the Charter, a second statement in Article 25, which would merely be aimed towards an obligation of the Member States to carry out decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter would be superfluous. 40 Hence, Article 25 of the UN Charter does not serve as a general norm of authorisation, but clarifies that also the Security Council must observe the general principle as laid down in Article 2(5) and hence that its resolutions are only binding if they are achieved according to the procedure provided for in the Charter. In the present case the applicable procedure is actually the one provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
It is generally accepted by now that the creation of international criminal tribunals falls within the Security Council's mandate of securing international peace and security. 41 It is true that the ICTY and ICTR were created under different circumstances, namely with regard to serious violations of international humanitarian law, involving hundreds of thousands of victims killed. Still, the creation of this Special Tribunal also falls within the Council's mandate. First, the concept of a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39 of the UN Charter was deliberately phrased in an indeterminate, broad way which is open to interpretation, in order to give leeway to the Security Council.
42 Th e Security Council itself had declared Hariri's assassination to be a terrorist act and a threat to international peace and security. 43 Hereby, it reiterated its former declarations that terrorism 40) J. Delbrück (supra n. 39). 45 Th e killings of Hariri and the other victims also qualify as terrorist acts as they differ from simple criminal offences, since the death of the victims was not the decisive aim. Instead, there had been other targets and motives behind those acts, presumably the destabilization of the whole region. 46 Second, to make the number of casualties the decisive factor would lead to the arbitrary question where exactly to draw the line between national and international prosecutions. Th e attacks of 11 September 2001, although "only" leading to the -in comparison with the situation in Rwanda or the Former Yugoslavia relatively -small number of approximately 3,000 deaths, were qualified as a threat to the peace, albeit the existence of the United States itself had never been in danger. 47 Furthermore, in most cases of terrorism the immediate harm of the attacks is disproportionate to the larger consequences for the concerned State. 48 Hence, a series of attacks, albeit of a smaller scale, especially if it can be attributed to the involvement of a third state and is aimed at the destabilisation of a State as a whole, can also qualify in this regard. It follows that, since a situation in the sense of 
Article 39 of the UN Charter existed, the measures of Chapter VII were open to the Security Council, including Article 41 of the UN Charter and therewith the creation of an international tribunal. One major line of argument concerning the authority of the Security Council to create ad hoctribunals is the attempt to break the circle of violence within long-lasting conflicts and thereby to forgo the resumption of hostilities in the future. Th is rationale also seems to be applicable to the conflict in Lebanon.
Th ird, a Chapter VII resolution is generally warranted in cases of international criminal prosecutions, where the assistance of third states is necessary, e.g. with regard to the handing over of suspects or evidence. 49 In the present case, Res. 1757 (2007) failed to explicitly establish any obligation for third states, especially for Syria, despite the proposal of the SecretaryGeneral. 50 However, only a resolution under Chapter VII, which is capable of justifying an intervention in the domestic affairs of a Member State, otherwise prohibited by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, could also bind Lebanon directly. Res. 1757 (2007) thereby effectively put an end to the Lebanese debate over the constitutionality of the Tribunal. 51 Hence, the prohibition of interference in domestic affairs by the UN, as laid down in Article 2(7) of its Charter, was not a bar, but a reason for the passing of Res. 1757 (2007) .
Fourth, while the process of parliamentary approval of an international treaty can be seen as such a matter that is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, the precedents concerning international prosecutions of crimes of interest to the wider State community also point towards a resolution under Chapter VII. Not only were the ICTY and the ICTR established in such a manner; 52 also the so-called "Lockerbie- Lastly, taking the rule on complementarity of Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the ICC to reflect a general principle of the subsidiarity of criminal proceedings by other bodies than those of the home States of the victims or the perpetrators, 55 the prolonged inability of the Lebanese parliament could be seen as a situation in which a State is "unwilling or unable" to fulfil the task of prosecution of a crime itself. Th is would then trigger a collective response, in this case by the UN Security Council.
Th ese considerations lead to the overall conclusion that the UN Security Council acted lawfully when it passed Res. 1757 (2007). Th is is also evidenced by the fact that despite alleged legal reservations, no Member State of the Security Council voted against it. Since it is primarily the responsibility of the Security Council to determine the legality of its acts itself, 56 especially the "Permanent-5" are expected to apply their vetoes to situations of alleged illegality. 57 Whether it was politically expedient to do so is another question. Art . 24(2) UN Charter states that the Council must act within the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and among these observe the requirement to act in conformity with principles of justice and international law, Art. 1(1) UN Charter.
C. Th e Special Tribunal as a Resolution-Based Tribunal
Since the Security Council created the Tribunal directly, for the first time since the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, it is closer to the group of resolution-based tribunals. Th us, the Tribunal is more than just another "UN-backed" tribunal. 58 First, the Tribunal can now only be terminated by the Security Council. Second, a tribunal created under Chapter VII generally has greater authority to request international cooperation from third States. A bilateral agreement cannot create binding obligations for third States, 59 unless the Security Council adopts a supporting resolution under Chapter VII. 60 However, in practise Chapter VII powers alone do not always ensure cooperation either, as this depends more on the political will of the respective state and the possibilities of enforcement on the part of the institution. 61 As already indicated, the STL-Statute does not explicitly provide for obligations of third States to cooperate with it.
62 Th is is due to the original approach to establish the Tribunal by a bilateral treaty. When the Tribunal was eventually established by Res. 1757 (2007) instead, only the provisions of that draft agreement were put into force, without additional language requesting outside cooperation besides provision of a seat and contributions to the budget. Th is may be seen as a major shortcoming of the Tribunal. 63 However, as the example of the SCSL shows, this 58) Th e Secretary-General seems to prefer the term "UN-assisted tribunal" in his report; however, "UN-based" is also used (supra n. 29, para. 17). may not be decisive. 64 Furthermore, it is arguable that these obligations to cooperate are now implied in the Statute, as they may be needed for the Tribunal to function effectively, and all Member States are under the obligation to assist and to carry out the measures decided by the Security Council under Chapter VII (Article 48, 49 UN Charter). 65 In fact, a treaty-based Tribunal would have had less legal leverage to demand international cooperation than the resolution-based IIIC. While Syria has recently cooperated with the IIIC to the general satisfaction of its Commissioner, 66 it has stated it would not cooperate with the Tribunal. It remains to be seen whether Syria will cling to this attitude.
Th e greatest disadvantage of the present approach is that the Tribunal can now be seen -and exploited -as being imposed on Lebanon. A consensual approach, despite its legal shortcomings, would have been preferable, since the long-term acceptance by the affected society is of paramount importance in the field of post-conflict justice. Ratification by the elected Lebanese legislators would have gone a long way toward increasing its perceived legitimacy. If Lebanon had voluntarily subscribed to the Tribunal, no intrusion into national sovereignty could have been claimed. Now obstacles with regard to domestic law were circumvented; 67 but it remains to be seen whether this is an advantage or a disadvantage, and especially whether the Lebanese population in its majority is still willing to accept the Tribunal.
IV. Institutional Characteristics
Initially, according to Article 7(a) STL-Statute, three chambers will be created.
68 Th e trial chamber will consist of two international judges and one national judge; the Appeals Chamber will include three international and two national ones. Hence, the international judges would form the majority needed for a judgment. Th is is generally thought to ensure greater neutrality of a tribunal. Th e so-called "super-majority" of the ECCC, where the Cambodian national judges form the majority in a chamber but need the support of at least one international judge, 69 therefore continues to constitute the exception. Th e presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber is also going to be the President of the Tribunal as a whole. In addition, two alternate judges, one of them Lebanese, and as a third "chamber" a single international pre-trial judge will be designated from the beginning.
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Hence any pre-trial issues, including the confirmation of indictments, 71 could be addressed quickly; by the same token, should any of the sitting judges be unable to continue his or her duties, a replacement would be available immediately. All of this is designed to avoid unnecessary delays in the proceedings.
All of the judges, as well as the Prosecutor and the Registrar, will be appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN. 72 With the exception of the Lebanese Deputy Prosecutor, 73 the government of Lebanon therefore only has the right to propose candidates. In comparison, at the SCSL the government appoints the national judges; at the ECCC all judges are appointed by a Cambodian council, albeit in the case of international personnel only upon nomination by the Secretary-General. 74 degree of judicial expertise. Th ird, the national candidates need to be Lebanese; at the SCSL, the national judges only need to be appointed by the government, 76 and in fact only two of the present four "national" judges are of Sierra Leonean nationality.
Another innovation is that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the Tribunal will take over from the IIIC. 77 Th erefore much investigative work will already be conducted before the Tribunal itself comes into existence. In effect, the IIIC serves as somewhat of a "preliminary OTP". It has been suggested that the IIIC, as a creation of the Security Council, does not provide for sufficient legal safeguards, especially with regard to the rights of persons detained since August 2005, and that the take-over of its results by the planned Tribunal would only perpetuate this "denial of national and international justice", leading to a "state of permanent lawlessness". 78 While it is true that human rights safeguards against Security Council actions are limited, 79 the IIIC has continuously stressed its adherence to the highest legal standards available in order to ensure the admissibility of the evidence found before a future tribunal. 80 In addition, the eventual creation of the Tribunal could instead serve to remedy any possible violations of e.g. any defendant's right to a fair trial within a reasonable time, since then judges would be able to look into all matters, including any alleged unlawful or unnecessarily prolonged detentions.
81
Besides the Chambers, the Prosecutor, and the Registry, the Tribunal will also have a Defence Office. Th is additional branch is designed to ensure the equality of arms and to support the proceedings where the accused has not chosen legal counsel. It is the first time that the Defence 
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Office is explicitly institutionalized in the statute of an international tribunal. Th is gives it a higher formal status than at other tribunals; for example, at the SCSL, where such an office was first established, this was done only by the court's rules of procedure. 82 Furthermore, the role of victims is strengthened. Like in other tribunals, the Registry will have a special victims and witnesses unit. But in addition, victims will have the right to present their views in proceedings and the right to bring a claim for compensation before competent national bodies based on a decision of the Tribunal.
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V. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
A. Th e Situations to be Prosecuted
Th e personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal covers "persons" in general; no quali fication concerning the degree of responsibility 84 or nationality is added. Hence, the international Prosecutor enjoys wide discretionary powers for his or her strategy. 85 Th e Tribunal will have subject-matter jurisdiction over the assassination of Rafik Hariri as well as other acts between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, if it finds them to be similar in gravity and nature and to be connected to that incident; later incidents may also be investigated, if the parties and the Security Council consent.
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But the decision actually to prosecute any cases apart from Hariri's death will be up to the Tribunal. Ultimately, the Tribunal itself will define its mandate under a potentially open-ended temporal jurisdiction.
It has been suggested that the Tribunal would be the first international tribunal to tackle a political crime against a single person. 87 as well as influential journalists, most of them known for their explicit opposition to Syrian influence in Lebanon, as well as many members of the general public. While the sheer number of affected victims is considerably smaller in comparison to other situations which have given rise to prosecution by international tribunals, it is apparent that the attacks were strategically planned to destabilize a whole country. In fact, among the various possible motives for each attack, the IIIC is looking closely at the hypothesis that Rafik Hariri's likely success in the May 2005 elections was the main reason behind his assassination. 92 Th us, it is safe to say that attacks on the very state structure of Lebanon would be subject to scrutiny by the Tribunal.
B. Th e Terrorist Attacks as de facto International Crimes
Th e applicable subject-matter law will be Lebanese criminal law only, especially with regard to crimes of terrorism; 93 its domestic laws on rules and procedures, as well as principles of international criminal procedure, shall guide the judges of the Tribunal when adopting their own. 94 Hence, the Security Council and the Lebanese government both agreed that the attack on Hariri constituted a local crime committed in violation of Lebanese law. 95 Th is too is a deviation from past practices in various ways. First, the traditional international criminal tribunals (the ICC, the ICTY and the ICTR) only have jurisdiction over international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In contrast, hybrid tribunals usually provide for a mixture of international and national crimes as potential bases for indictments. 96 Th e Tribunal will be the first international tribunal without any of the so-called core crimes against international law included in its jurisdiction. Th e critics of the Tribunal therefore argue that its creation was unwarranted, as no international crime was in question. 97 But two aspects speak against this assumption. First, the mere possibility of prosecuting crimes under national law before international tribunals is nothing new, as the jurisdictions of other hybrid tribunals indicate; second, a qualification of the acts in question as international crimes seems actually plausible. During the negotiations on the STL-Statute, a qualification as crimes against humanity was rejected because there was no unanimity among the members of the Security Council, despite suggestions of the Secretary-General to that effect.
98 Th e latter had pointed out that the attacks in question could meet the definition of a crime against humanity, although there were differences in scope and number of the victims when compared to other situations which are subject to the jurisdiction of international criminal jurisdiction. 99 To start with, acts of terrorism can under certain circumstances amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes. for the attacks in New York and Washington of 11 September 2001. In the instant case the constitutive elements seem to be in place, such as murder and serious injuries etc. as actus rei. Furthermore, modern international customary law does not require a nexus to an on-going armed conflict; instead, political motives may suffice. 101 However, while indeed the various bombings appear to have been connected, it seems to be arguable whether these have been "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population". While the attacks of "9/11" were considered to be crimes against humanity since they formed part of a widespread attack against the population of the United States, 102 the situation in the present case appears to be different. On the one hand the attacks committed in Lebanon since October 2004 could -in the words of the Secretary General -reveal a "methodical plan" of attacks against a civilian population, albeit not in its entirety. 103 On the other hand, history and past practise seem to indicate that the scale of the attacks in question is an important criterion. 104 And it could be questioned whether there is sufficient connection between the seemingly isolated events carried out over the course of two years. Th erefore, with a view to, first, the relatively small number of approximately 60 deaths and 500 injured persons in total and, second, to the intent behind the deeds which is presumably the political destabilisa- tion of the State and not a widespread attack against the civilian population as such, the rejection of a qualification as a crime against humanity in the present case appears to be acceptable. 105 Nevertheless, this does not oppose a qualification of these acts as international crimes. Th e fact that acts of terrorism were not included in the Rome Statute of the ICC does not mean that they are excluded from the list of international crimes in general. 106 Indeed, the absence of a clear definition of terrorism in international law could lead to the conclusion that terrorism can still not be seen as a discrete international crime.
107 But attacks such as in the instant case which are aimed at the destabilization of a whole country, with wider repercussions for the surrounding region and possible support from other countries, can well be seen to be "most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole". 108 Th is was in fact acknowledged as such in an annex to the Rome Statute and recommended for discussion at the 2009 ICC review conference.
109 Although overlap may occur, there may also be policy considerations to treat terrorism as a category distinct from crimes against humanity or war crimes, as the ultimate aim of such an act most often is the coercion of a State or a population, 110 and the killing of innocent persons is only a means to that end. Th e proposal to prosecute terrorist acts under the existing core crimes largely stems from the absence of a special jurisdiction in this regard, namely under the Rome Statute. Hence this necessity decreases once an international court specifically addresses the issue. Th is may be comparable to the discussion concerning universal jurisdiction by national courts for international crimes, which primarily originated from the absence of international enforcement mechanisms; now that more and more international criminal courts and tribunals have been established, the call for regimes of universal jurisdiction may become less pressing.
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While it may be argued that crimes of international concern really call for the application of international law, it was probably beyond the scope of the negotiations on this Tribunal to find a solution for the general problem of defining terrorism conclusively. Actually, one possible result of the present endeavour could precisely be a general definition of terrorism construed and applied by an international court. 112 While it may be acceptable that the acts in question do not fall into the existing core crimes, including crimes against humanity, it would be unwarranted to qualify them as purely national crimes. Th e Rome Statute is only exhaustive with regard to its own jurisdiction. And the existing international treaties condemning terrorism, 113 as well as other sources of law, 114 indicate that such a prosecudefines a terrorist act as "any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act". tion would not be ex post facto. 115 It must be admitted that in the present case the Security Council did not chose to pursue this avenue, but instead opted for a prosecution solely on the basis of national law. However, the decisive point is that in substance the acts to be prosecuted also have an international character. 116 Th at substantive national and international criminal laws are not mutually exclusive is already evidenced by the fact that the Rome Statute of the ICC needs to be transformed into national law in order to make it applicable in national courts if a Member State wants to claim the privilege of primary jurisdiction under the complementarity regime of Article 17 of the Rome Statute;
117 from a formalistic point of view, this would make even the "core crimes" crimes under national law.
118 It is also safe to assume that the judges of the Tribunal, in applying the Lebanese statutes, will look beyond Lebanese borders for additional guidance.
In sum, the doubts as to the warrant to create an international tribunal, which are based on the asserted absence of an international crime, are unfounded. First, the circumstance that the Tribunal shall apply Lebanese criminal law does not per se oppose to a qualification of the relevant acts as de facto international crimes. Second, it can be argued that the fact that Lebanese law, unlike international law, provides for a definition of terrorism, 119 120 Th us, the discussion of whether the alleged crimes could be qualified as international crimes has no impact on the possibility to create a tribunal of an international character.
C. Further Progressive Developments with Regard to International Criminal Law
One remarkable point is that the death penalty is excluded from possible penalties, although it is accepted in Lebanon. 121 Th is is in line with the consistent practices of international criminal tribunals supported by the UN.
122 While the practices on the national level is still not uniform, 123 as the case of the Iraqi Special Tribunal demonstrates, it is noteworthy that Rwanda in July 2007 approved the abolition of the death penalty in its domestic law in order to allow for the referral of cases from the ICTR and other jurisdictions to its national courts. Furthermore, the government may not grant amnesties for the crimes in question and any amnesties already granted shall be disregarded. 125 Th e non-applicability of amnesties is also the rule at the SCSL, at least as long as proceedings before international tribunals and crimes under international law are concerned. 126 Th e exclusion of amnesties is therefore a further indicator that the crimes in question are de facto treated as international crimes. However, it is not clear whether this rule would also apply to amnesties granted by States other than Lebanon. Language as well as object and purpose would support such a reading; the nature of a bilateral agreement would have pointed against it. In effect, Resolution 1757 (2007) may be seen as further authority that amnesties for serious crimes are now prohibited. Th is would be in line with the general trend in international law towards a refusal of amnesties, 127 as for example confirmed by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, when it held that an amnesty granted for torture would not spare perpetrators from being held criminally responsible. 128 Th is trend is based on a general sense of "justice" that requires a person who committed a crime to be punished, since prosecution does not only give significance to the victim's suffering and serves as a partial remedy, but also prevents private revenge and has a deterring effect. 129 Lastly, the report of the Secretary-General stresses that at the Tribunal many elements of civil law are to be found; among these are a more active role of the judges and the possibility for trials in absentia of the accused. 130 Th e former is exemplified by the fact that the judges would be the first in questioning any witnesses; furthermore, they may call additional witnesses themselves. 131 While this is a general development in reaction to the practical difficulties of conducting an international trial under adverse conditions, 132 the second aspect is more problematic. Trials in absentia are not uniformly accepted even in civil law countries and raise concerns with regard to the principle of a fair trial, as laid down e.g. in Article 14 ICCPR. 133 Th ose civil law countries which accept this sort of trial only do so in exceptional circumstances and in conjunction with specific safeguards. In addressing these concerns, the mandatory appointment of defence counsel either by the accused or through an assignment by the Defence Office and the possibility of a re-trial are foreseen in the Statute of the Tribunal. 134 Th e general rule was included due to fears that other States, especially Syria, could refuse to hand over suspects. Still, trials in absentia could again seriously jeopardize the legitimacy of the proceedings as perceived by the general public and could be a detriment to the whole project of promoting justice in Lebanon. 135 With good cause, the drafters of the Rome Statute only allowed for trials without the presence of the accused if that person continuously disrupts the proceedings. 136 It can only be hoped that the Prosecutor will exercise restraint in the use of this option, as otherwise the proceedings could face allegations of "show trials".
VI. Operational Aspects
Th e official languages of the Tribunal will be Arabic, French and English. 137 It will have its seat outside Lebanon, with an investigative office in Beirut. 138 Th is was decided partly due to the security situation. It will be the first time that the main seat of a hybrid tribunal is not established "in theatre", i.e. within the country where the crimes under investigation were committed. On the other hand, a "split" prosecutorial seat is already utilized at the ICTR, 139 and the SCSL has relocated one of its trials, namely the one against Charles Taylor, from Sierra Leone to the seat of the ICC at Th e Hague. 140 In order to facilitate access to the Tribunal for witnesses and the public, a location in the region was envisaged at first. One suggestion was Cyprus, to which the IIIC had already relocated during the armed conflict with Israel in the summer of 2006.
141 However, in July 2007 the Secretary-General formally proposed Th e Hague, and the Dutch Government positively responded one month later. 142 While it is certainly clear that the Dutch seat of government has much experience in hosting international tribunals, this will run contrary to one of the main structural principles of hybrid tribunals, namely to provide for as much local participation as possible in order to create a sense of "ownership" by the affected society.
Th e last point of contention during the negotiations in 2006 was the mechanism for financing the Tribunal. Th e report of the Secretary-General included various options on this issue, and the relevant part of the draft agreement had been left blank.
143 Th e preferred option of the SecretaryGeneral involved some measure of assessed contributions from the UN budget. However the Security Council decided in favour of voluntary contributions from States, which are to provide 51% of the funding; the remaining 49% of the budget shall be financed by the government of 137) Art. 14 STL-Statute foresees the possibility of limiting proceedings to one or two working languages. 138) Art Lebanon. 144 Th e Tribunal will not come into existence until the SecretaryGeneral has gathered enough funds for the first year of operation -approximately US$ 30 million -and pledges for the second and third -approximately US$ 45 and 40 million, respectively. 145 Th is leads to a problem that already the present tribunals are confronted with, namely the great difficulties to collect enough voluntary funding to remain operational. On the one hand, the reluctance of the Security Council to fund another international tribunal, in the light of the immense costs incurred by the ICTY and ICTR over the past years, may be a primary reason for the presently preferred option of establishing new ad hoc courts outside of the UN system. 146 On the other hand, in case voluntary contributions fall short, the argument that the budget should be supplemented by the UN now carries more weight since it was the Security Council that created the Tribunal directly.
Th e process of collecting enough initial funds as well as selecting the judges and other personnel will take at least a year. Th erefore the Tribunal will not become operative before mid-2008 at the earliest. But the transition from the already existing IIIC to the OTP of the Tribunal should make this process speedier than elsewhere. Th e Commissioner of the IIIC Bellemare (Canada) is also the Presecutor-Designate of the STL. By March 2008, Robin Vincent (United Kingdom), the former Registrar at the SCSL, had been appointed as the Registrar of the STL, the management committee had been established, premises in Th e Hague had been identifi ed, and more than US$ 60 million had been received in contributions and pledges. Th e Tribunal is to have an initial mandate for three years of operation, with a view to a possible prolongation. 147 Th e SCSL had at first also been intended to operate for a period of three years only, but will now most likely take at least eight years to conclude its work. Th e experiences of the latter shows that even with the greatest efforts of the staff and immense financial pressure by donors, a tribunal's operation usually lasts longer than originally planned. At the Lebanon-Tribunal, the conduct of operations will be assisted by a management committee. 148 A body of this kind, in which the major donors and stakeholders are represented and which has budgetary oversight, was also first implemented at the SCSL.
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VII. Th e Perspectives of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Politically, Lebanon seems to be a divided country. At present, backers of the western leaning government of Prime Minister Siniora on the one side and of President Lahoud and the Hezbollah-led opposition on the other, allegedly supported by Syria and Iran, are locked in a stand-off. Th e creation of the Tribunal has been one of the fundamental points of contention within Lebanese public debate since late 2006. 150 Both proponents and opponents to the Tribunal regard it as a major factor in enabling -or in contrast endangering -the continuation of the peace process and the eventual completion of Lebanese national sovereignty. Th e proposed Tribunal was strongly criticised as enforcing political divisions among the Lebanese population and as an "instrumentalization of international justice". 151 Some even see the Tribunal as the focal point of a Franco-American conspiracy against Syria and as an attempt to ensure the continuing influence of Western States in Lebanon. More moderate critics point to inconsistencies concerning the lack of international judicial mechanisms for investigating potential war crimes during the war with Israel in 2006, or even during the Lebanese civil war in 1975 to 1989. 152 But the fact that the latter two proposals seem entirely unrealistic at present should not detract from the assessment that a tribunal aimed at the most recent problems could at least be one step towards reconciliation. For the first time, the circle of violence may be broken by a neutral allocation of accountability.
Th e future will show whether the fears that this international tribunal would spark new violence or even lead to a new civil war were legitimate. 154 But most of these attacks seem to have been isolated events, staged by relatively small groups of persons, without a large backing in the Lebanese population. Th e next important step will be the election by the Lebanese Parliament of a successor to President Lahoud, whose term expired on 23 November 2007. 155 From the viewpoint of international law, however, most of the objections specifically aimed at the Tribunal seem to be unfounded. Admittedly, there are aspects which may dampen its legitimacy, such as the fact that the Tribunal was eventually established by a resolution of the Security Council and not by the proposed agreement with a sovereign state; that its location may be far away from the country; that the Tribunal will apply national criminal law; and that trials in absentia are possible. But these challenges may be overcome if all persons involved show restraint in order to avoid an alienation between the Tribunal and further parts of the Lebanese population. More importantly, these aspects should not keep the general public from accepting the Tribunal as an instrument to assist their struggle of coming to terms with their past, even if its creation was sub-optimal. Legally, the Tribunal represents a real advancement in the further development of effective but fair instruments for international adjudication and demonstrates many lessons learned from other existing international criminal tribunals; among these are the provisions for efficient trial management; the simple majority of international judges; the statutory defence office; the management committee; the enhanced role of victims; the use of evidence collected by the IIIC according to the highest standards; and the rejection of the death penalty. 156 Other criminal tribunals have shown that international judicial institutions can to some extent contribute to national peace and reconciliation. More generally, neutral third parties can assist in addressing deep-rooted conflicts which the State itself is unable to solve. Th ere is reason to believe that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, consisting of a diverse group of judges and other personnel, operating according to a clear set of rules, and observed by the world legal and political community, can also serve this function. Overall, more arguments point towards the conclusion that the Tribunal deserves a chance to prove itself.
From the vantage point of the development of international criminal law in general, the establishment of the Tribunal is another step in the ongoing effort to push back impunity and to use formalized international justice as a means to promote regional stability and peace. It could even be seen as a necessary precondition to that cause. 157 Although the Tribunal belongs to the so-called third generation of hybrid international tribunals, it adds some new components to this already diverse group. Moreover, as the short period of time needed for the negotiations indicates, the international criminal tribunals of the recent past now provide so much institutional experience that one can almost speak of the possibility of courts "off the shelf ". Lastly, the Tribunal highlights that even after the coming into force of the Rome Statute, a need for new international tribunals may arise, especially in cases where the ICC has no jurisdiction. 158 Some have predicted that ad hoc-tribunals will become irrelevant once the ICC is operative, or at least will only have importance for conflicts of the past. 159 However, the proposed Tribunal could be an indication that any international system of justice which lies ahead still has space for a diversified 160) Comp approach. In fact, hybrid international tribunals set up with the consent of the State in question could even be seen as fulfilling the principle of complementarity as enshrined in the Rome Statute. 160 All of these points indicate that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will most likely not be the last international criminal tribunal to be realistically debated. Whether this leads to a greater manifestation, or instead fragmentation, in international criminal law remains to be seen. But international juridical options as answers to large-scale violent conflicts are here to stay.
